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COMMENTS

The Regulation of Interstate Bank Branching
Under the International Banking Act of 1978:
The Stevenson Compromise
In recent years observers have noted a remarkable flow of capital
into the United States;' foreign investment has almost quadrupled
within the last decade. 2 A segment of the economy in which foreign
penetration is dramatically evident is the American banking industry.
From 1973 to 1978 the U.S. holdings of foreign banks increased nearly
300%, from $24.6 billion to $96.1 billion.3 This compares with a 64%
increase in the assets of domestic banks. 4 In New York and California,
where 90% of all foreign bank assets in the United States are held, foreign banks accounted in 1978 for 43 and 35%, respectively, of the total
outstanding commercial and industrial loans.5 In 1972 there were 52
foreign banks with offices in the United States, 6 and by November 1978
there were 129."
The increased foreign presence in the American banking industry
results from general systemic changes within the international money
8
markets, such as the development of the market for Euro-dollars.

I

See, e.g., Inestment Inflow- Foreign Stake in U.S. Rises but is Dwarfed by U.S. Stake
Abroad,Wall St. J., July 3, 1978, at 1, col. 6; The Buying ofAmerica, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 1978,
at 78.
2 The Buying ofAmerica, supra note 1, at 81. The inflow of funds has been attributed to many
factors, but it is generally ascribed to a faith held by foreigners in the basic political and economic
stability of the United States and to their desire to capture a greater share of the large American
market. See Investment Inflow." ForeignStake in U.S. Rises but is Dwarfed by U.S, Stake Abroad,
supra note 1, at 1, col. 6.
3 Here Come Foreign Banks Again, Bus. WEEK, June 26, 1978, at 78.
4 Id.
5 Confinement ofDomestic Banking in the United States, BANK STOCK Q., Oct. 1978, at 2-3.
6 The Buying ofAmerica, supra note 1, at 88.
7 Gruber, Foreign Banks Still Boom, Chi. Tribune, Feb. 4, 1979, § 5, at 1, col. 3.
8 The Federal Reserve Board lists several of the important developmental factors as:
The increase-more than fourfold-in the size of the Euro-dollar market since 1970 and,
generally, the use of the U.S. dollar as a vehicle for international transactions have spurred
banks in major industrial countries to establish a presence in the United States in order to
clear the progressively larger volume of dollar transactions generated by their expanding international activities, to manage their liquidity positions, and to take advantage of arbitrage
opportunities in international money markets.
Foreign banks have also established U.S. offices to finance trade and working capital
needs and to provide foreign exchange, payments, and other corporate services for large
home-country corporations that have invested in the United States. These investments have
increased significantly since 1971. In addition, foreign banks compete with U.S. banks in
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However, the marked increase of foreign banks in recent years can be
attributed in part to an awareness that federal control of foreign banking in the United States was imminent. 9 By expanding their operations
before the passage of federal legislation, foreign bankers hoped to take
advantage of expected grandfather clauses which would ensure the
continued existence of established offices.' 0 In the fall of 1978, the federal control that had been anticipated finally materialized. The International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA), the first comprehensive regulation
of foreign banks at the federal level, was signed into law." Statechartered foreign banks, as well as those which elect the newly provided option of federal chartering, were made subject to the provisions
of the IBA.
Prior to the International Banking Act foreign bank activity was
regulated by the individual states, rather than the federal government.' 2 Foreign banks' freedom from federal control gave them certain competitive advantages over domestic banks. For example,
foreign banks were not required to hold reserves at the Federal Reserve
or to purchase insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 13 Furthermore, foreign banks were permitted to open branches in
more than one state, a privilege denied domestic banks. 14 Before the
proliferation of foreign banks in the American market, the advantages
held by foreign institutions created only a slight competitive disparity
between domestic and foreign banks. 15 When the competitive disparity
widened because of the significant increase in foreign bank activity,
federal legislators responded with the IBA.
financing trade bf U.S. businesses with their home countries and in meeting the needs of
multinational companies.
Recent Growth in Activities of U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks, 62 FED. RES. BULL. 815, 817-18
(1976).
9 ForeignBanks Gain Timefor Expansion, Bus, WEEK, Apr. 24, 1978, at 35.
10 See ForeignBanks Gain Timefor Expansion,supra note 9, at 36.
11 Act of September 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
12 The federal government could, through indirect means, affect a small portion of the American operations of foreign banks, but the primary regulation of their activities fell to those individual states which permitted foreign banks to operate in their financial markets. For a
comprehensive examination of pre-IBA regulatory policy, see Halperin, The Regulation ofForeign
Banks in the United States, 9 INT'L LAW. 661 (1975).
13 See generally The Buying of America, supra note 1, at 82. See also note 64 infra.
14 The restrictions upon interstate branching are based in both state and federal legislation.
Individual states prohibit the entry into their markets by domestic banks chartered in other states,
and the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970), prohibits national banks from branching interstate.
See Note, The InternationalBanking Act of 1978: FederalRegulation of Foreign Banks in the
United States, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 151 (1978).
15 Halperin, supra note 12, at 686.
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The framers of the IBA regarded the foreign institutions' ability to
branch interstate as the "single most controversial aspect of [foreign
bank] operations in the United States."' 6 Of the proposed restrictions
in the IBA, limits upon interstate branching were viewed as the most
important. 17 Powerful interests were aligned for and against federal
regulatory control of foreign bank interstate branching.
The statutory provisions that emerged from this controversy attempt to address the concerns of both proponents and opponents of
regulation. It is this deft compromise, developed by Senator Adlai Stevenson,'8 which is the focus of this comment. The general history of
the international banking legislation and positions supporting and op-'
posing the regulation of interstate branching will be discussed. Thereafter, the elements of the Stevenson compromise will be explained and
their efficacy illustrated. Finally, the current and potential effects of
the compromise upon the entire banking system will be explored.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS

The first congressional study of foreign bank activity in the United
States was undertaken in 1966.19 Subsequently several bills for the regulation of foreign banking were introduced, 20 but all died in committee. Legislative activity heightened after the proposals of the Federal
Reserve Steering Committee on International Banking were submitted
to Congress in 1974.21 International banking legislation was introduced each successive year.22 In April 1978 the International Banking
Act of 1978 was passed by the House of Representatives. 2 3 In August
the Senate approved the bill after making extensive revisions, 24 and the
16 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING
ACT OF

1978, S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as

SENATE

REPORT].
17 House PassesBill to

ControlBrancheso/ForeignBanks, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
Adlai E. Stevenson III is the Junior Senator, Democrat, from Illinois. Senator Stevenson
proposed the central provision, § 5, of the compromise on interstate branching. Section 14, proposed by Senator H. John Heinz III, became an adjunct to the central provision and for the
purposes of this comment will be included in the discussion of the Stevenson compromise.
18

19 J. ZWICK, FOREIGN BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, PAPER No. 9.
20 H.R.

89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
570, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 6856, 90th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1967); S. 1741, 90th
Cong., IstSess. (1967); H.R. 4841, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
21

120

22

Foreign Banking Act of 1975, S. 958, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); International Banking

CONG. REC.

38001 (1974).

Act of 1976, H.R. 13876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); International Banking Act of 1977, H.R.
7325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
23 124 CONG. REC. H2574 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1978).
24 124 CONG. REC. S13396 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978).
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Senate version was adopted by the House. 25 President Carter signed
the IBA into law on September 17, 1978.26
During the evolution of the IBA, the elimination of foreign banks
from the domestic market was not seriously considered. 27 The foreign
presence in the United States banking industry has been recognized as
beneficial to the American public. 28 The IBA does not attempt to exclude foreign institutions; it was designed to equalize the competitive
postures of domestic and foreign banks.29 The goal of the framers was
to establish parity of treatment, 30 clearly placing the focus of the regulations upon the enhancement of competition. 3' The reception accorded the IBA in the international banking community suggests that
the goal was achieved. Lord O'Brien, President of the British Bankers'
Association and former Governour of the Bank of England, has commented that "the new Act is in general not unreasonable in its provisions and gives the promise of stable conditions for the foreseeable
future."

32

To achieve parity the IBA extends to foreign banks the ability to
acquire nationally chartered banks or to charter their own national
banks,33 to establish Edge Act corporations, 34 and to obtain insurance
25 124 CONG. REc. H8829 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978).
26 Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note 11.
27 See, e.g., Unequal Opportunity, BANK STOCK Q., May 1978, at 20; Confinement of Domestic
Banking in the United States, supra note 5, at 4.
28 For example, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, G.
William Miller, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, stated:
The Federal Reserve has welcomed the entry and activities of responsible foreign banks
in this country. . . . They have contributed to a more competitive environment in our banking markets and to the more efficient functioning of our money and credit markets. The
banking and financial services available to the American consumer and businessman have
been enlarged by their presence. . . . The Board's support for Federal legislation to regulate
foreign banks has never been intended to curb their ability to operate in this country. Rather
it has been motivated by the desire to provide a secure framework at the Federal level, in
which foreign banks might operate here and which would be fair and equitable to all participants in the banking industry.
InternationalBanking Act of 1978.- Hearingon H,.R. 10899 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions ofthe Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4
(1978) (statement of G. William Miller) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing].
29 SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 2.

30 Id.
31 Besides the encouragement of competition, and the discouragement of monopoly, the other
suggested reasons for the controlling of banks include the protection of depositors, the regulation
of money and credit, and the control over the economic and political power of banks. See Morse,
Control of MultinationalBanking Operations, BANKER, Aug. 1977, at 99-101.
32 O'Brien, UnitedStates Sets the Boundariesfor Foreign Banks, BANKER, Dec. 1978, at 19.
33 Section 2 of the IBA, amending 12 U.S.C. § 72, provides the Comptroller of the Currency
with the discretion to waive the U.S. citizenship requirement for a minority of the directors of a
national bank, and § 4, amending scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., allows foreign banks to choose
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through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 3 5 Foreign banks
are, however, now subject to the reserve requirements of the Federal
Reserve Board 36 and to the restrictions of the Bank Holding Company
Act. 37 Additionally, foreign banks are now restricted in their ability to
38
establish branches in more than one state.
Among the IBA's provisions, none were so hotly contested or so
subject to change as those dealing with interstate branching. During
1977 and 1978, four revised versions of section 5 were considered by
Congress. The first was part of the proposed 1977 Act and prohibited
interstate branching by federal or state branches of foreign banks until
such time as national banks were extended the same privilege. 39 This

strong regulatory stance was reversed in the second version of section
5,40 the version eventually passed by the House. 4' Under the second,
foreign banks which had elected to federally charter their operations
were not allowed to branch interstate because of the prohibition contained in the McFadden Act. 42 State-chartered foreign institutions
between a federal or state branch or agency in those states open to foreign banking. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 16, at 3, 6-7.

34 The Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1970), provides domestic banks with the opportunity
to establish corporations throughout the United States, to finance international trade and business.
These corporations cannot enter into domestic banking, and can only accept those deposits incidental to the international transactions they facilitate. Section 3 of the IBA amends the Edge Act,
allowing foreign banks to own Edge corporations and liberalizing the regulations on all such
operations. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 3-6.

35 Section 6 of the IBA, amending scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., allows foreign bank
branches to obtain insurance from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). If, however, the foreign branch accepts deposits of less than $100,000 and the branch is federallychartered or chartered in a state which requires deposit insurance of its domestic banks, then
FDIC coverage is mandatory. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 12-14.

36 The Federal Reserve Board's powers to set reserve requirements are extended by § 7 of the
IBA, amending scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. The Federal Reserve can now set reserve requirements upon federally-chartered foreign branches and agencies, and also upon state-chartered
branches and agencies of foreign institutions with worldwide consolidated bank assets in excess of
$1,000,000,000. Sections 6, 7, 11, and 13 provide for the framework of federal supervision and
examination of foreign bank activity in the United States. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at
13-14.
37 The Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1970), provides for the
approval and complete supervision of the Federal Reserve Board for the non-bank activities and
enterprises conducted directly or indirectly by domestic banks. Section 8 of the IBA amends the
BHCA by subjecting foreign banking institutions to these same restrictions. The provision does
include, however, a liberal grandfather clause which permits the continued existence, some temporarily and some permanently, of the non-bank activities which are not permissible under the
BHCA. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 14-17.

38
39
40
41
42

See notes 101-07 and accompanying text infra.
International Banking Act of 1977, supra note 22, at § 5.
H.R. 10899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H1602 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978).
124 CONG. REc. H2571 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1978).
H.R. 10899, supra note 40, at § 5.
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43
were permitted to continue branching into those states allowing it.
This mild version would not have significantly altered the prevailing
regulatory framework or restricted foreign banks in their interstate
branching. 44 It is likely that foreign banks would have forgone federal
chartering rather than be precluded from the opportunity to branch interstate. 45 A third version, amending the provisions of the second, was
proposed, 46 but rejected, 4 7 in the House. The amendment would have
required, in addition to the approval of state banking regulators, explicit statutory authorization for interstate branching by state-chartered
branches of foreign banks.48 The Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, dissatisfied with the House-passed version, developed a fourth approach which became part of the final
IBA.4 9 This revised section 5, suggested and championed by Senator
Stevenson, was described by the Senator as a "means of skinning a
' 50
couple of cats and still producing parity.
Essentially, section 5 of the Stevenson compromise permits interstate branching by foreign banks into those states expressly allowing
their presence, but places certain limitations on the ability of the
branches to accept deposits. Outside their home states, 5 1 foreign bank
branches may accept only those deposits incidental to the international
transactions they facilitate. 52 Section 5 also contains a grandfather
clause which permits foreign bank branches already in existence to
continue operations. 53 Section 14 mandates that a study be prepared
and be submitted to Congress on possible revisions of the McFadden
Act. 54 These provisions of the Stevenson compromise have muted the
55
debate which once polarized the entire banking community.
THE FOREIGN BANK INTERSTATE BRANCHING CONTROVERSY

A variety of persons, organizations, and institutions took sides in
43 Id.

44 See House Passes Bill to Control Branchesof Foreign Banks, supra note 17, at 3, col. 2.
4 5 Id.
46 HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING

ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP. No. 910, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].

47 124 CONG. REC. H2571 (daily-et. Apr. 6, 1978).
48 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 46, at 1-2.

49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note 1I,at § 5.
Senate Hearing,supra note 28, at 72 (question of Sen. Stevenson).
See notes 106-07 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 101-04 and accompanying text infra.
See note 105 and accompanying text infra.
See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
Ganoe, How the Rules Changedfor American Banking, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1978, at 135.
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the heated controversy surrounding the regulation of interstate branching by foreign banks. Principal supporters of national restrictions were
federal banking regulators and regional American bankers. An unusual coalition formed the opposition. As the natural objects of the legislation, foreign banks with current or planned investments in the
United States were, as a matter of course, opposed to the proposed regulations. Aligning themselves with the foreign bankers, however, were
state banking regulators who represented the interests of the individual
states and the large American-based multinational banks. In spite of
their unlikely association and their disparate reasons, all three groups
supported the continuation of the status quo5 6 and fought to eliminate,
57
or at least dilute, the proposed restrictions on interstate branching.
Federal banking regulators-primarily the Federal Reserve
Board, the Department of the Treasury, and the Comptroller of the
Currency-relied on the notion of national treatment as a theoretical
basis for the federal regulation of foreign banks. 58 When foreign businesses are afforded national treatment they are allowed to function
much as domestic firms do, enjoying the comparable advantages and
suffering the comparable restraints. 59 Since domestic banks are restricted in their ability to branch interstate, 60 it was strenuously argued
that foreign banks "should play by our rules-even if the rules are not
thoroughly satisfactory."' 6 1 To reinforce the argument for national
treatment of foreign banks, advocates of regulation emphasized that
the United States was virtually the only country in the world in which
neither the central government nor the central bank regulated the activ62
ities of foreign banks.
The support of regional American bankers for restricting foreign
bank activities was based upon a fear of further foreign expansion into
the domestic market. 63 Regional bankers pointed out that the ability to
branch interstate had allowed foreign banks to capitalize on their
56 See note 12 supra.
57 See notes 39-54 and accompanying text supra.
58 Eg., Senate Hearing,supra note 28, at 7 (statement of G. William Miller, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), 64 (statement of Robert H. Mundheim, General Counsel, Department of the
Treasury), 88 (statement of John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency).
59 Id. at 64 (statement of Robert H. Mundheim).
60 Note 15 supra.

61 Senate Hearing,supra note 28, at 88 (statement of John G. Heimann).
62 Terzakis, How to Regulate Foreign Banks?, BANKING, July 1976, at 74. Other commentators have suggested possible arguments for national, over state, regulation based upon the Commerce Clause or upon the supremacy of international treaties. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 12,
at 674-79.
63 Foreign Banks Gain Time/or Expansion, supra note 9, at 36.
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unique capabilities 64 in regional markets and had already enabled foreign banks to make significant inroads into their territories. 65 Although
foreign competition had not yet seriously affected regional bankers, the
advantages held by foreign banks were perceived as a ripening competitive threat. 66 Foreign banks had begun to attract the type of domestic
corporate client which had traditionally looked to regional banks for its
financial needs. 67 Regional banks were also threatened in the area of
retail banking, where aggressive competition for deposits was foreseen.

68

The principal argument advanced by foreign banks in opposition
to federal regulation of their activities was that foreign banks posed no
real threat to domestic institutions.69 Foreign bankers asserted that
their expansion into the American market did not result from regulatory advantages. 70 Such advantages were regarded as largely theoretical,7 ' because the foreign presence was limited, for the most part, to
only three states: New York, California, and Illinois. Furthermore,
domestic banks engage in a large degree of interstate activity through
loan production offices, 72 Edge Act corporations, 73 grandfathered in64 In addition to interstate branching, regional bankers complained that the lack of reserve
requirements and FDIC insurance payments had reduced costs to foreign banks, thereby reducing
their loan rates. See The Buying ofAmerica, supra note 1, at 82; Dufey and Giddy, Eurobankers
May Lose theirAdvantage over US Banks, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1978, at 102. Also, foreign banks
are traditionally more highly leveraged and accustomed to lower profit margins and smaller
spreads, thus making it possible to offer better rates than can domestic banks. See Adkins, Foreign
Banking's U.S. Invasion, DUN's REV., Feb. 1978, at 78. Foreign banks are also able to transfer
funds from the parent to the U.S. affiliates, obviating the need to pay high prices for domestic
funds. See Gruber, supra note 7, at 4, col. 2. See also Unequal Opportuniy Lenders, FORBES,
Aug. 21, 1978, at 34-35.
65 See Adkins, supra note 64, at 76.
66 Foreign Banks Gain Timefor Expansion,supra note 9, at 36 (comments of Robert B. Palmer,
Executive Vice President, Philadelphia National Bank).
67 This type of client was characterized as the smaller corporate borrower who was without
access to the commercial paper market. Field, Biting into the Big Apple, EUROMONEY, June 1978,
at 53.
68 See Halperin, supra note 12, at 663; Adkins, supra note 64, at 76. Deposits are zealously
guarded by retail bankers, for they are regarded as the "raw material" of banking. Senate Hearing, supra note 28, at 155 (statement of Robert B. Palmer, President, Bankers' Association for
Foreign Trade).
69 See Bellanger, The Foreign Challenge to U.S. Banks, BANKER, Oct. 1978, at 40.
70 Id. See, e.g., Senate Hearing,supra note 28, at 186 (statement of Serge Bellanger, Vice
President and Chairman, Legislative Committee, Institute of Foreign Bankers), 247-48 (statement
of Peter Leslie for the Banking Federation of the European Community).
71 See Reimpell, US Plans to Restrict Foreign Banks Leave a Bad Taste in German Mouths,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1976, at 61.
72 Loan production offices are operated by the large domestic banks, outside the states in
which they are based, as sales offices for their loanable funds. Although no official contract sign-
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terstate bank affiliates, 74 and non-bank affiliates of bank holding companies. 75 It was noted that thirteen of the largest American banks had
1,483 offices conducting banking-type business in 43 states, not including the states in which their operations were based. 76 Given this level
of interstate activity by domestics, foreign bankers argued that a restriction upon their interstate branching was not necessary to facilitate com77
petitive equality.
The lobbying efforts of state branching authorities were considered
the most powerful of those opposing the IBA. 78 The state regulators

exerted strong pressure to avoid federal interstate branching regulations which could hinder states interested in attracting foreign banks to
their regional markets. 79 E.D. Dunn, President of the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors and Georgia Commissioner of Banking and Finance, stated: "The real question in the interstate branching issue is
not competitive equality between foreign and domestic banks, but competitive equality among the states themselves."'8 0 Supporters of the regulators' position that restrictive interstate branching regulation would
reduce competition between regional financial markets and national
money centers asserted that restrictions would confine all future foreign
banking activity to the states where international financial centers were
already established. 8 ' Other states would be denied the opportunity to
82
interest foreign institutions in their banking markets.
The large American banks with multinational operations joined
the opposition to the federal regulation of interstate branching by foreign banks. American multinational bankers feared that restrictive national legislative action could trigger foreign retaliation. 83 With U.S.
ing or funds transfers can take place in these offices, the bulk of the negotiation process is conducted by the loan production officer. See Senate Hearing,supra note 28, at 124.
73 See note 34 supra.
74 Then-existing interstate subsidiaries of five foreign and seven domestic bank holding companies were permanently grandfathered by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. See Confinement of Domestic Banking in the United States, supra note 5, at 9 (includes table of grandfathered
operations).
75 See note 37 supra.
76 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H2566 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Annunzio).
77 See Guenther, Legislative Doldrums, 126 BANKER 1143, 1145 (1976).
78 Competing in America, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1978, special survey supplement at 52.
79 Foreign Banks Gain Time for Expansion, supra note 9,at 35.
80 Senate Hearing,supra note 28, at 144 (statement of E.D. Dunn).
81 I.e, New York, California, and Illinois. HousE REPORT, supra note 46, at 45 (additional
views of Rep's Rousselot, Hansen, Hyde, Kelly, and Grassley).
82 Id.
83 See Competing inAmerica, supra note 78, at 52. The fears of American multinational bankers were based upon the veiled and not-so-veiled threats of foreign bankers. See The Regulator;'
Environment: Killing the Golden Goose, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1978, at 52. Exemplifying the threat-
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bank assets overseas about three times greater than those of foreign
banks in the United States, 84 American multinational bankers decided

that they had more to lose from counter-restrictions placed upon them
abroad than they had to gain from federal regulation of foreign bank

activity in the U.S.85 American banks are not generally restricted to
86
single regions in foreign countries which have permitted them access,
although some nations demand reciprocal treatment before granting
entry to a U.S. bank. 7 For example, a foreign country may not permit
a Kansas bank to open a branch within its country, unless its own
banks may open a branch in Kansas. If restrictive branching limitations were passed at home, domestic multinationals feared reciprocal
88
treatment would foreclose profitable banking opportunities abroad.

The American multinational bankers' second rationale for objecting to branching limitations reflected a domestic, rather than international, motive. The large U.S. banks hoped to utilize the growth of
foreign interstate branching as a primary argument for permitting them
also to cross state lines.89 American multinationals did not seek to restrict their foreign competitors; they sought to free themselves from reg-

ulation, so that they could meet the challenge of foreign bank
competition. 90 The expansion of foreign banks across state borders was
considered to be the "opening wedge" through which domestic banks

could secure the same privilege. 9 ' The elimination of this wedge would
weaken the large American banks' case for removing the limits upon
their ability to branch interstate.
ening attitude are the following excerpts from an article authored by Peter Reimpell, Managing
Director, Union Bank of Bavaria.
It is understandable that political forces were set in motion to put [foreign banks] on an
equal footing with domestic banks, but the timing of the proposed measures creates a bad
taste, as it happens when the one-way flow of US investment abroad is turning into a reciprocal two-way flow....
The International Banking Act [of 1976] is being proposed after US banks have successfully built their international organizations. . . The same opportunity may now be taken
away from foreign banks in the US ....
At present there may seem to be no fear of retaliation. But resentment and political
counter-currents build up with time, and retaliation cannot be excluded if the intended legislation becomes too restrictive and goes beyond what is considered fair treatment.
Reimpell, supra note 71, at 61-62.
84 See The Regulatory Environment: Killing the Golden Goose?, supra note 83, at 52.
85 See Competing in America, supra note 78, at 52. See also Unequal Opportunity, supra note
27, at 20.
86 See The Regulatory Environment: Killing the Golden Goose, supra note 83, at 52.
87 See Halperin, supra note 12, at 655-56, 672-74.
88 Competing in .4merica, supra note 78, at 52.
89 Morse, Control ofMultinationalBanking Operations,BANKER, Aug. 1977, at 35.
90 Confinement ofDomestic Banking in the United States, supra note 5, at 4.
91 Ganoe, supra note- 55, at 135.
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THE STEVENSON COMPROMISE

The reconciliation of divergent viewpoints achieved in the interstate branching provisions of the International Banking Act has been
characterized as a "classic case of common sense compromise." 92 Congress accommodated the concerns of interested parties and avoided
producing the hardships envisioned in alternate courses of action. The
Stevenson compromise afforded a workable and equitable solution to
the hotly debated question of interstate branching by foreign banks.
The compromise actually provides few restrictions, for it speaks
principally to the branch form of organization. 93 Restrictions upon the
subsidiary form of foreign bank expansion were already contained in
the Bank Holding Company Act. 94 The IBA reasserts the limits upon
the subsidiary form, prohibiting the establishment of subsidiaries
outside a foreign bank holding company's home state. 95 The agency
form of organization, under which foreign banks are statutorily limited
in their ability to transfer customers' funds, 96 is permitted continued
utilization under the Act. 97 However, a foreign bank may not maintain
a federally-chartered agency in a state where it already has a federal
branch or state branch or agency. 98 Under the IBA, representative offices, the foreign banks' counterpart of domestic loan production offices, 99 must now be registered with the Treasury Department. 100
Section 5(a) (1-4) of the IBA10 provides a new type of branching
92 Id. at 137.
93 For a discussion of the organizational options open to foreign banks, see Note, supra note
14, at 151-54. See also Halperin, supra note 12, at 663-65.
94 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1849 (1970). A subsidiary bank is owned and/or controlled by a bank
holding company, and its purchase or establishment subjects the holding company and subsidiary
bank to regulation by the Federal Reserve Board. See Halperin, supra note 12, at 664.
95 Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note 11, at § 5(a)(5). For a discussion of the term "home state,"
see notes 106-07 and accompanying text infra.
96 No deposits are accepted by agencies; only credit balances for loan customers may be maintained. See Note, supra note 14, at 152.
97 Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note 11, at § 4.
98 Id.

99 See note 72 supra.
10 Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note 11, at § 10.
101 Sec. 5. (a) Except as provided by subsection (b), (1) no foreign bank may directly or
indirectly establish and operate a Federal branch outside of its home State unless (A) its
operation is expressly permitted by the State in which it is to be operated, and (B) the foreign
bank shall enter into an agreement or undertaking with the Board to receive only such deposits at the place of operation of such Federal branch as would be permissible for a corporation
organized under section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act under rules and regulations administered by the Board; (2) no foreign bank may directly or indirectly establish and operate a
State branch outside of its home State unless (A) it is approved by the bank regulatory authority of the State in which such branch is to be operated, and (B) the foreign bank shall
enter into an agreement or undertaking with the Board to receive only such deposits at the
place of operation of such State branch as would be permissible for a corporation organized
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opportunity for foreign banks. Outside a bank's home state,10 2 the
traditional form of branch organization in which a bank conducts fullservice operations cannot be utilized. If a foreign bank obtains state
and federal approval, it can establish a limited branch, however. Deposits other than those arising out of the international financial transactions facilitated by the limited branch are forbidden. The limitation on
deposits parallels a similar provision contained in the Edge Act. 10 3 Express approval of an admitting state, derived from appropriate state
law, is mandatory for the entry of foreign branches.' 04
In spite of the limitation on branching contained in the IBA, a
grandfather clause, section 5 (b),105 assures existing foreign branches the
right to continue complete operations. Under section 5(c)106 a foreign
bank may elect as its home state any state in which it has a branch,
agency, subsidiary bank, or subsidiary commercial lending company.
If it fails to elect a home state, the selection will be made by the Federal
Reserve Board. The Senate Banking Committee instructed the Board
to prevent manipulation of the home state selection process by foreign
07
banks attempting to evade IBA restrictions.1
Section 14 of the IBA 0 8 mandates that the President shall submit
within one year a report analyzing the present restrictions on interstate
under section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act under rules and regulations administered by
the Board; (3) no foreign bank may directly or indirectly establish and operate a Federal
agency outside its home State unless its operation is expressly permitted by the State in which
it is to be operated; (4) no foreign bank may directly or indirectly establish and operate a
State agency or commercial lending company subsidiary outside of its home State, unless its
establishment and operation is approved by the bank regulatory authority of the State in
which it is to be operated ...
Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note II, at § 5(a).
102 Notes 106-07 and accompanying text infra.
103 Note 34 supra.
104 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 21.

105 [Sec. 5] (b) Unless its authority to do so is lawfully revoked otherwise than pursuant to
this section, a foreign bank, notwithstanding any restriction or limitation imposed under subsection (a) of this section, may establish and operate, outside its home State, any State branch,
State agency, or bank or commercial lending company subsidiary which commenced lawful
operation or for which an application to commence business had been lawfully filed with the
appropriate State or Federal authority, as the case may be, on or before July 27, 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note I I, at § 5(b).
106 [Sec. 5] (c) For the purposes of this section, the home State of a foreign bank that has
branches, agencies, subsidiary commercial lending companies, or subsidiary banks, or any
combination thereof, in more than one State, is whichever of such States is so determined by
the election of the foreign bank, or, in default of such election, by the Board.
Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note 11, at § 5(c).
107 SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 11.

108 Sec. 14. (a) The President, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Board, the Comptroller, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
shall transmit a report to the Congress containing his recommendations concerning the applicability of the McFadden Act to the present financial, banking, and economic environment,
including an analysis of the effects of any proposed amendment to such Act on the structure
of the banking industry and on the financial and economic environment in general.
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branching contained in the McFadden Act. The report is to examine
both the effects of the McFadden Act restrictions upon the general
financial, banking, and economic environment, and the likely effects of
any recommended changes.
The Stevenson compromise produces the parity in treatment for
domestic and foreign banks which the legislature was seeking. Foreign
banks are provided interstate opportunities that are similar to those already exploited by large American banks. The limited branches provided for in section 5, in conjunction with the subsidiaries, agencies,
and representative offices, allow foreign banks to pursue roughly the
same activities as domestic banks engage in with their Edge Act corporations and loan production offices. Furthermore, foreign banks' existing interstate operations are liberally protected by the grandfather
clause of the Stevenson compromise. Nonetheless, regional banks are
immunized from the risk of losing their retail deposits to the bigger,
more highly competitive foreign banks, since foreign bank limited
branches cannot accept such deposits. State banking authorities are
still permitted to attract foreign banks and their supplies of loanable
funds to regional financial markets. The fear of multinational bankers
that overly-restrictive legislation would produce retaliation against
their affiliates abroad is dissipated by the fact that section 5 does not
unreasonably discriminate against foreign banks. In addition, the multinational bankers' hopes for the liberalization of domestic regulations
are preserved by Congress in section 14, which mandates a review of
the McFadden Act.
The passage of the IBA has quieted the controversy surrounding
the presence of foreign banks in the United States. 0 9 Most American
and foreign bankers have praised the legislation.I t0 The success of the
IBA derives from the willingness of Congress to consider and accommodate the legitimate concerns of different interest groups in the U.S.
banking community. It is apparent that the chief vehicle for this accommodation, the Stevenson compromise, achieves an equitable solution to the most immediate problems of competitive imbalance in
American banking.
(b) The report required by subsection (a) shall be transmitted to the Congress not later
than one year after the date of enactment of this Act.
Pub. L. No. 95-369, supra note 11, at § 14.
109 Ganoe, supra note 55, at 135.
110 Gruber, supra note 7, at 1, col. 3.

Regulation of Interstate Bank Branching

1:284(1979)
THE IBA

AND THE FUTURE OF INTERSTATE BRANCHING

Beneath the arguments for and against interstate branching by foreign banks rests the more fundamental controversy concerning interstate branching for all banking institutions in the United States. To
stimulate congressional debate on this issue, section 14 of the International Banking Act orders a presidential review of the McFadden
Act."' This provision has been described as furnishing the IBA with
2
an "importance far beyond its legislative purpose.""
The achievement of the stated goal of parity in treatment for foreign and domestic banks was a practical first step in the revision of
banking regulations. The prohibitions now placed upon interstate
branching by the Stevenson compromise avert the problem which
would arise if foreign banks were allowed to continue to expand their
interstate operations without limits, while the growth of domestic banks
remained suppressed by the McFadden Act. Without the IBA and in
the event of the continuation of the McFadden Act, the decision at
some future date either to terminate the expanded operations of foreign
banks or to deny domestic banks the same opportunities would have
been exceedingly difficult." 3 The purpose of the IBA is to equalize the
competitive postures of participants in the banking system, not to maximize competition absolutely. The current competitive environment has
been stabilized; additional improvement of competition in the banking
industry awaits further congressional action.
The opponents of the McFadden Act view the restriction of interstate branching as anti-competitive. Senator Thomas McIntyre characterized the McFadden Act as "the real culprit. . . which was enacted
over 50 years ago and whose ghost limits competition in our banking
system."" 14 It is generally hypothesized that the repeal of the McFadden Act would foster a consolidation of most of the individual banks in
the United States, concentrating the industry in a few giant national
banks." 5 This concentration is regarded by supporters as long overdue
and as necessary to enable U.S. banks to successfully compete in the
II1 Note 108 and accompanying text supra. The one-year presidential study was mandated,
instead of a multi-year commission, for it was determined that this was the most expedient and
effective means of securing recommendations and information necessary for legislative reform.
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 11.
112 Ganoe, supra note 55, at 135.
113 See Senate Hearing, supra note 28, at 68 (statement of Robert H. Mundheim, General
Counsel, Department of the Treasury).
114 124 CONG. REc. S13,394 (daily ed..Aug. 15, 1978) (remark of Sen. McIntyre, Chairman,
Senate Subcomm. on Financial Institutions).
115 See Ganoe, supra note 55, at 137.
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world market."t 6 Anticipated benefits accruing from concentration
center upon reduced costs to customers and increased profits to bank
shareholders." 17 One speculative advantage is that a greater degree of
banking sophistication would be channeled to regional markets
through the expansion of large money center banks. It is possible that
American export activity would increase as businesses availed themselves of the expertise of multinational bankers.
In addition to the argument that restrictions on interstate branching hinder competition, another argument has been raised against the
McFadden Act. In testifying on the IBA, three highly-placed federal
regulators argued that structural and technological changes in the
banking industry and in the entire economic system have eroded the
rationale for restrictions imposed over fifty years ago."18 Commentators have noted that the advancements in electronic funds transfer systems" 9 and the influx of foreign participation in the banking market
20
undermine the validity of the McFadden Act.'
An advocate of the McFadden Act's repeal described the current
regulatory scheme in dramatic terms:
State boundaries confine growing banks like the constraining wires
that inhibit the growth of bonzai trees, bending back a natural expansiveness so as to produce powerful but constricted individuals ...
. . . The narrow-minded defense of meaningless geographical restraints is backward-looking, costly, unimaginative and, in the long run,
futile. 12
Section 14 of the International Banking Act ensures a review of the
interstate branching prohibition. The adoption of the provision provides pressure for significant change. Within this element of the Stevenson compromise lies the potential for great transformation of the
American banking system, for both domestic and foreign financial institutions.
Robert F Van Patten, Jr.
116 See generaly Confinement of Domestic Banking in the UnitedStates, supra note 5, at 1-2.
117 Id.
118 Senate Hearing,supra note 28, at 9 (statement of G. William Miller, Chairman, Federal
Reserve Board), 68 (statement of Robert H. Mundheim, General Counsel, Department of the
Treasury), 88 (statement of John G. Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency).
119 For a discussion of a topical segment of the electronic funds transfer systems controversy,
see Peck and McMahon, Recent FederalLitigationRelatingto Customer-Bank Communication Terminals ("CBCTs" and The McFadden Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 1657 (1977).
120 See generally Barnes, The Fine Edge ofProhibition: Interstate and Foreign Banking in the
United States, 93 BANKING L.J. 911 (1976).

121 Unequal Opportunity, supra note 27, at 19-20.

